Yashika, in the making
Case study 02 · Real work The Channel P&L Gazette Vahdam India · Amazon India · 2025–26

Brand growth / E-commerce / P&L

I stopped asking what we should launch next.

100+ SKUs. 10 categories. ₹52–57 lakh a month. And a contribution margin that was quietly going the wrong way.

▶Watch the story · 2:23Once upon a P&L…

A glass of blue butterfly pea tea with lemon
100+SKUs
10Categories
₹52–57LA month
16% → 24%Contribution margin

The story behind the slides

So, here's what happened.

An illustrated short, written from this case study. Real work at Vahdam India, 2025–26. Margin figures from the channel P&L; the D2C and social teams also built demand. Illustrations, narration and music were made with AI tools; every fact comes from the case study below.

Read the transcript

Everyone kept asking what we should launch next. I stopped asking.

I ran Vahdam's Amazon India business. Over a hundred products, ten categories, fifty-two to fifty-seven lakh rupees a month.

The headline target was growth. But the number that mattered was contribution margin. Revenue looked healthy. The P and L underneath it didn't. We were spending to stay visible, and that kept getting more expensive.

So I went looking for leaks. Ads bidding on searches that never converted. Products nobody bought. Prices nobody had revisited. A brand store built once and left alone.

Then I found a clue in our own recipe pages. We sold butterfly pea tea as a wellness product. Our recipes used it as a blue drink that turns purple when you add lemon. The product had a story. We just weren't leading with it.

So, fix what's broken before building anything new. Six levers, in order. Set prices around margin, not habit. Cut search terms that never converted. Rebalance the campaign mix. Run an ABC analysis and cut the long tail.

Rebuild the brand store so people can actually browse. And add samplers and gift ranges, so people try four teas instead of choosing one. On the listings: same product, same price, a different argument. Plus a spreadsheet that ruined a Tuesday.

From January to the end of April, contribution margin went from sixteen to twenty-four percent. And Turmeric Curcumin, a product we already had, grew from three or four lakh rupees a month to eight to ten.

But I can't take all the credit. The direct-to-consumer and social teams were building brand demand at the same time. A good part of those eight points was mine. Some of it was theirs.

We didn't do anything revolutionary. No new agency, no bigger budget, no shiny new product. We mostly fixed what was broken. And it taught me to distrust my first instinct, which is usually to make something new.

The brief

The headline target was growth. The number that actually mattered was contribution margin.

I ran Vahdam's Amazon India business across assortment, pricing, promotions, advertising, content, inventory and the channel P&L. For a while, I was treating growth and margin as if they were the same problem.

They weren't.

What was happening

“Revenue looked healthy. The P&L underneath it didn't.”

Tea is crowded. Amazon is even more crowded. We were spending to stay visible, and staying visible was getting more expensive every quarter.

What wasn't working

I went looking for the leaks. There were several.

Ads were bidding on search terms that had never converted. The catalogue carried SKUs nobody bought but everyone still had to forecast, store and discount. The Brand Store had been built once and left alone. Pricing had been set at some point and then inherited. And the listings described the products without giving anyone a reason to choose them.

Plug the leaks. Press each label.

16%January24%End of April

the order mattered more than any single lever

Five leaks. Start with one.

The line illustrates closing the gaps, not the contribution of each lever. Only the two endpoints are measured results.

none of this was dramatic. that's exactly why it had survived.

The “Hmm…”

What do we already have that isn't working?
Blue butterfly pea tea beside a lemon
Blue, until you add lemon — then purple.
Add lemon BlueBlue

I read our listings the way a customer would, then went back to our own A+ content and recipe pages. There it was.

We were selling butterfly pea flower tea as a wellness product. Our own recipes were using it as something far more interesting: a blue drink that turns purple when you add lemon. Nobody in India was searching for that yet, so there was no demand to harvest. The opportunity was to create the reason to search.

The product had a story.
We just weren't leading with it.

The move

Fix what was broken before building what was new. Six levers, in the order I pulled them.

one move sets up the next.

01

Pricing

Reset around contribution margin rather than historical habit.

02

Keyword negation

Cut search terms that had spent without ever converting.

03

Campaign mix

Rebalanced Sponsored Products, added Sponsored Brands and Display, so we stopped buying the same click twice.

04

ABC analysis

Cut the long tail. Fewer SKUs planned properly, not 100+ planned badly.

05

Brand store

Rebuilt as a place to browse the range, not a page that simply existed.

06

Assortment

Samplers and gift ranges: the cheapest way to get someone to try four teas instead of choosing one.

The making

Where strategy stopped being a plan and started becoming pixels.

Listing copy, imagery, A+ content and ad targeting, rewritten to lead with what the product does for the person rather than what it contains. Same product. Same price. A different argument.

Turmeric Curcumin listing image
Turmeric Curcumin listing image ↗
A+ content for Turmeric Curcumin
A+ content for Turmeric Curcumin ↗
Shatavari listing image
Shatavari listing image ↗
A+ content page
A+ content page ↗
Rebuilt Amazon brand store
Rebuilt Amazon brand store ↗
Brand store gifting section
Brand store gifting section ↗

Then the less glamorous work. Negative keyword lists that kept growing. An ABC analysis that meant telling people their SKU was going. A Brand Store rebuild nobody had asked for.

enough strategy. here's a spreadsheet that ruined a Tuesday ↓

The receipts, drawn from the channel P&L

16% → 24% Contribution margin, January to end of April 16%24% JanuaryEnd of April
₹3–4L → ₹8–10L Turmeric Curcumin, a month. Scaled, not launched Before₹3–4LAfter₹8–10L Monthly revenue · ranges, not averages
₹52–57L Monthly Amazon business, 100+ SKUs, 10 categories Monthly business range ₹52L₹57L100+ SKUs · 10 categories
About tenSKUs discontinued out of 100+ — the catalogue cut.

These numbers come from the channel P&L I owned. Anything I couldn't evidence stayed off the page.

What I can't take credit for

The margin came out of the Amazon channel. The demand didn't all come from it.

While I was cutting waste, the D2C and social teams were building brand demand, putting content into the market every week and sending people to Vahdam already knowing who we were. Someone who lands on a listing after seeing a brand three times behaves differently from someone who found it through a search ad. That shows up in conversion and cost of sale, and I can't cleanly separate it out.

So the eight-point improvement is real. A good part of it was mine. Some of it was enabled by people working in a different room. I'd rather say that than claim the whole number.

So, what?

We didn't do anything revolutionary. We mostly fixed what was broken. and that was the finding.
What I'd do differently

Eight points of margin came out of a business that already existed: pricing, negative keywords, campaign mix, a catalogue cut, a better Brand Store and better arguments on the product pages. No new agency. No bigger budget. No shiny new product. It taught me to distrust my first instinct, which is usually to make something new.

I'd have read our own content on day one instead of halfway through. And I'd have built the measurement for the content changes before making them, not after. I know the listing got better. I can't tell you exactly by how much. That's on me.